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7 Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Experience of Technology David L. Hildebrand Technology enchants; it makes us forget what we know about life. Sherry Turkle (2015, 13) It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, nor even of activ­ity in experience. Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had. John Dewey (1938, 12-13) Technological Practices and the Need for Theory 
To live in society means to live with technology. It is a complex, multifarious 
relationship, fraught with a variety of benefits and burdens. Often, when 
we think of technology, we focus mainly on the devices and the functions 
they provide. But, of course, these devices are embedded in larger technical 
systems as well as in the systems comprising existing institutions (banking, 
trade, education, etc.) and our personal social arrangements. The fact we 
live with and because of these systems means that when a new device, such 
as the mobile phone, is introduced, there are disruptions, both micro and 
macro. New practices arise, older ones vie for survival, and a cascade of 
changes causes both enthusiasm and consternation. What are we to make 
of these devices and their attendant practices? What new opportunities do 
they offer? Which cherished values do they threaten? How are they chang­
ing what or who we are? 
These questions raise the further question: how should we study such 
phenomena? What will shed light on their practical, phenomenological, and 
normative dimensions? How can we grasp what they mean, it1 the larg­
est possible sense? It is here that both social theory and philosophy can 
make their contributions. For while the introduction of new technologies 
is studied in detail by those with a financial stake (manufacturers, mar­
keters, investors, etc.)-and those with an indirect financial stake, such as 
industry-supported academic researchers-philosophers and social theoi;ists 
often raise broader, more normative concerns. Beyond sizing up individuals 
Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Experience of Technology 115 
as "users" or "consumers," with certain behavioral inclinations and choice­
preferences, they want to know how new practices effect well-being or 
capacity to contri�ute as a citizen. Do new technologies empower people 
to lead richer and more reflective interior lives? Such theorists, then, situate 
phenomena within a wider plurality of cultural and ethical imperatives. For 
this reason, one might argue, theorists are necessary for truly "objective" 
assessments because they are better positioned to challenge technologies' 
impact despite (or perhaps even because of) popularity and potential com­
mercial success. 
While I approach these issues as a philosopher, I'm no technophobe. 
Throughout my life, I've harbored a deep interest and affection for tech­
nology (especially phones, computers, and either consumer electronics); an 
early and enthusiastic adopter of technology, I am typically a key source of 
advice for family or friends. But my heart is changing, and I am increasingly 
skeptical. New technologies arrive too early and too often; they promise 
hyperbolically, break quickly, and inveigle more trust and resources than 
deserved. Moreover, technologists (and the press which cover them) never 
advise scaling back or eliminating technology; life, it seems, cannot be 
improved with techniques that are slower, simpler, or free. 
My more important concern regarding these devices' uses-the way they 
are transforming practice and experience in the spheres of family, work, 
education, and personal life. My contention is that new technologies­
particularly personal information technology (PIT)-are affecting expe­rience in profound ways that can best be understood using vocabularies 
rich in phenomenology and philosophically pragmatic analysis. While I do 
not find much in social science and communication theory that explores 
such deep changes in experience, my hope is that philosophical analysis can 
unearth some important discoveries which can then be reincorporated into 
both common sense and expert assessments of technology.1 
My paper proceeds as follows. After briefly explaining the pragmatic 
approach (I), I review the technological issues by consulting several com­
munication specialists (II); the key question is: how is PIT amending or 
changing our practices? Most important among these theorists is Sherry 
Turkle whoj more than the others, pushes beyond usual analyses of behav­
ior and usage to the psychological, even existential, stakes. But because 
Turkle only raises philosophical questions and does not inquire into them, 
she opens the door to a philosophical investigation of technological experi­
ence (III). Here, I deploy the work of John Dewey, William James, and John 
J. McDermott; these pragmatists articulate different categories of experi­
ence and provide nuanced techniques as to how such experience can be 
analyzed. Finally, applying their work, I make connections between tech­
nology, experience, and (pulling it all together) pragmatist aesthetics (IV). 
I conclude with the suggestion that pragmatist aesthetics provides useful 
ideals for evaluating, normatively, new technologies being deployed into 
everyday life. 
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While further details about pragmatism will be discussed later, here is the 
basic pragmatist framework within which experience is to be understood. 
Pragmatists understand human agency in terms of ongoi�g practices. B�t 
practices are not behaviors somehow separable from feelmgs �nd ex�en­
ences; there is a dynamic and iterative relation between undergomg, cogitat­
ing, and acting. In brief, no encounter is ever completely nai·ve or raw; rather, thinking is proleptic-always occurring in a matrix of ongoing �eelings and 
purposes. Action, too, cannot be radically isolated, for we act m resp�nse 
to feelings and purposes. Any practice, then, is constituted by collocat10ns 
of encounters, thoughts, and actions all taking place in environments with 
both physical and cultural dimensions. Such environments contexti:alize 
practices in crucial ways. An environment may be fecun
_
d and conductive �f 
practices' growth; they may be barren or even destructive of growth. Envi­
ronments can change, too; fecundity can be replaced by toxicity, transform­
ing or destroying practices. This, in general, is the pragmatist picture. �t is 
a transactional ecology of organisms-constituted-by-practices encountermg, 
cogitating, and acting in and with their environment. The Pragmatic Concern: What Is Technology Doing to Experience? 
Given this framework, it is possible to telegraph a couple of pragmatist 
concerns about the experience of technology. (Evidence for these concerns 
follows, shortly.) First, if experience is being fundamentally altered by new 
practices-engendered by, �or example, personal informati?n �echn�lo­
gies (PIT)-then we are obligated to understand these alterat10ns qualita­
tive character. It is plausible, now, to think that the way we encounter the 
world is changing; the question is: how? Second, the pragmatist will also 
be concerned about how reflective knowing is changing. As described by 
the ecological framework described earlier, knowing emerges from encoun­
ters ("had" experience). Therefore, if encounters are changing (if we are 
increasingly distracted or fragmented by technology), then we must try to 
understand what happens to thinking built upon such experience. Are the 
resources for intellection being degraded? Finally, if both encountering and 
thinking is being altered by PIT, what might this portend for our efficacy as 
actors? 
To my mind, these questions about the impact of technology upon experi­
ence and human practices relate directly to this volume's missions. One mis­
sion is to conceptualize action and practice; my contribution argues that the 
technological practices we are adopting are still unclear, even disturbing, to 
us. Conceptualizing them helps locate them as they penetrate our life activi­
ties. In addition, the volume also seeks to identify the ways in which prac­
tices can be normative. Again, technological practices call out for normative 
assessment. After all, much is at stake. The level of specific assessments may 
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be local (e.g., are cell phones ruining dinners?) or global (e.g., are we seek­
ing control at the expense of authentic feeling?) but the key lesson is that 
normativity is inescapable. While practices can be described narrowly, no 
neutral description is ever possible; every description involves selection and 
emphasis and thus raises questions about prescription-normativity. Prac­
tice theory, and pragmatism, both acknowledge and engage the normative 
dimension from the get-go. Recent Themes in Communication Analyses of PIT PIT and Absent Presence 
A large literature documents and analyzes the use of technologies of vari­
ous kinds, including smart phones (PIT). While Turkle is part of this litera­
ture, she pushes beyond it into philosophical territory. Before discussing her 
work, and the philosophers relevant to it, a quick review of several promi­
nent issues around PIT will be helpful. 
The first deals with the phenomenon Kenneth Gergen (2002) names 
"absent presence," when people make themselves "absent" from face-to­
face situations ("co-presence") by engaging with PIT. Analysts are not uni­
vocal on the implications of this phenomenon. Gergen worries that such 
absences can weaken trust and even moral standards. (Gergen 2002, 232) 
At the same time, Gergen acknowledges that the technology can empower 
"new integrations" of people across distances (Gergen 2002, 239). Richard 
Ling, an academic also employed by the Norwegian mobile powerhouse 
Telenor, harbors no similar worries; while absences can be disruptive of 
social life, he argues that because PIT uses are becoming "embedded" in the 
social fabric (as clock time was), people are adjusting their expectations and 
etiquette. (Ling 2012, 3-4)2 PIT and Interpersonal Relationships 
A second prominent research area concerns PIT's effects upon interper­s?nal _relationships, especially those created and sustained in co-present s1tuat10ns. Researchers generally recognize that the near-constant avail­ability afforded by PIT can be both comforting and stressful. Gergen's view is decidedly mixed: PIT can undermine co-present relationships in ways that might weaken moral obligations and even lead to a "whole­sale devaluation of depth in relationship" (Gergen 2002, 233 ); alternately, though, he sees that cyber-relationships can provide empathy and support otherwise lacking, and that such contacts may facilitate closer and more 
�ntimate bonds that can reinforce co-present relationships. Ling, again, 1s much less worried. Because PIT functions as social mediators, people are prone to forgive a variety of drawbacks (Ling 2012, 7-8). PIT makes micro-coordinations possible, permitting people to exchange information 
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and feelings; the net effect is often, he argues, improved social cohesion 
(Ling 2012, 1 1 1-112). Ling draws upon Erving Goffman's work on ritual 
to argue that our new technologies are giving rise to new rituals, the fun­
damental basis for all relationships.3 Theorist Nancy Baym, now with the 
Microsoft corporation, sees the issue as frequently double-sided; on one 
hand, PIT offers people greater control over relationships via enhanced 
contact. On the other hand, that increased potential for control may result 
in the disclosure of private information and opens up the possibility of 
manipulation by others.4 Still, Baym, like the others, sees ways in which 
new messaging abilities can extend relationships into new domains and 
communities of interest (Baym 2015). PIT and Self-Identity 
A third pertinent area of inquiry concerns PIT 's effects on self-identity. 
While this is another extraordinarily complex topic that cannot be summa­
rized here, several interesting points are germane to this essay's remainder. 
Gergen, again, strikes chords of both worry and hope. Individuals' increased 
investment in a "floating world" of online information and communication 
may result in a dangerous divorce between people and "the pragmatics of 
everyday life" (Gergen 2002, 235). The divorce is dangerous because the 
more attention such floating worlds get, the less involved we are in co­
present communities. But these communities are crucial for the recognition 
selves need; deterioration of that sphere, Gergen argues, removes the "scaf­
folding for a recognizable self" (234 ); the skills and repertoires necessary 
for daily relations weaken, and a "coherent and centered sense of self, moral 
bearings" is threatened (Gergen 2002, 236). Yet Gergen strikes a hopeful 
note, too. PIT increases one's ability to be more selective about who can 
contact us, and so we can focus attention upon people that matter; that 
increased focus, he says, "more effectively sustains one's identity as a singu­
lar and coherent being" (Gergen 2002, 238). 
Baym, for her part, reviews both "utopian" and "dystopian" literature 
about effects on identity, but sees both as overwrought. Seeking to defuse 
their concerns, she writes: "These rhetorics are predictable, and tell us as 
much-if not more-about society than they tell us about technologies" 
(Baym 2015, 44). Unlike Gergen, she doesn't fret about the wide range of 
options for identity play, noting that the literature on embodied vs. online 
representation of identity shows that "most people, most of the time, use 
new media to act in ways mostly consistent with their embodied selves" 
(Baym 2015, 118). She notes that online activity can aid identity formation; 
for example, online self-disclosure, expression, and assertiveness practice 
can all "help people to work through issues involving control and mastery, 
gain competence, and find a comfort which they can then transfer to their 
embodied encounters" (Baym 2015, 139). Finally, she argues that the sup­
posed gap between online and offline relationships is overemphasized. "The 
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identity foundations on which new relationships are built," she writes, "can 
be just as sturdy online as off" (Baym 2015, 141). Sherry Turkle 
While Sherry Turkle's work fits squarely with that of Gergen, Ling, Baym, 
and the wider body of communications research, it ventures further in ways 
which bear directly upon philosophical issues. Turkle is a psychoanalytically 
trained sociologisr at MIT who has spent 30 years describing and analyzing 
technology's impact on our practices and identities. Her work encompasses 
what she calls "the 'subjective side' of people's relationships with technol­
ogy, especially computers" and focuses upon culture, therapy, mobile tech­
nology, social networking, and sociable robotics. 5 Her recent books, Alone Together (2011) and Reclaiming Conversation (2015), examine how the 
capacities and applications of recent technologies are already having deep 
impacts upon experience and identity formation. Her extensive and careful 
ethnographic and analytic work limn a host of ethical, political, and meta­
physical dilemmas raised by new technologies, incorporating case studies 
worthy of further philosophical analysis. Reclaiming Conversation paints a picture of PIT use that has become 
pervasive, intensive, and disruptive. Consider the following facts she relays 
about connectivity: Every 6.5 minutes, Americans check their phones; within 
five minutes of awakening, 25% of teenagers connect to a device; American 
teens send an average of 100 texts per day; 80% of teens sleep with their 
phones; 44% of teens never unplug, even during sports or religious services; 
most American students use four forms of media at any given moment. 
(Turkle 2015, 42) This is just a small sample of the data she presents, but 
it conveys the gist. In addition to teens, of course, parents and younger 
children are also using PIT. (I shall omit a picture of the Fisher-Price iPad Apptivity Seat, a baby bouncer for "Newborns-to-Toddlers" that includes a 
7-inch mirror with the "option to insert iPad (not included) into the mirror's 
case."6 ) As this degree of connectivity implies, PIT infiltration has spread to 
venues and practices fundamental to personal, educational, and professional 
life. Older practices are either being disrupted or displaced, including, for 
example, the family meal, breastfeeding, bathing and sitting with children, 
classrooms, offices, and public spaces such as cafes and streets. Thoreau's "Three Chairs" and Disruption 
Across venues, old norms are being modified or broken, spurred on by new 
technologies. Turkle is concerned, as are other researchers, not to judge 
these phenomena too rashly, nor lump them together. Culture is always 
complex and changing; there is a multiplicity of situations and applications 
of technology, so caution is warranted.7 The situations Turkle describes, 
however, are endemic enough-and their implications for the meanings of 
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our practices is profound enough-that attempts at psychological and phil­
osophical analysis are warranted. 
To organize her concerns as a psychologist and sociologist of technol­
ogy, Turkle draws from Henry David Thoreau's notion of "three chairs." 
In Walden, he writes, "I had three chairs in my house; one for solitude, 
two for friendship, three for society" (Thoreau 2004, 140). Thoreau is espe­
cially relevant today, Turkle argues, insofar as he sought to live deeply and 
deliberately in a milieu with accelerating degrees of clamor and distraction. 
Moreover, T horeau was not against conversation-unlike monks or sages, 
his proposal of more deliberate living didn't require vows of silence. Indeed, 
the three chairs metaphor provides Turkle with what she calls a "virtuous 
circle," and by understanding that circle we glimpse not only the value of 
conversation, but the basic dangers of PIT. 
These three chairs plot the points on a virtuous circle that links conver­
sation to the capacity for empathy and for self-reflection. In solitude 
we find ourselves; we prepare ourselves to come to conversation with 
something to say that is authentic, ours. When we are secure in our­
selves we are able to listen to other people and really hear what they 
have to say. And then in conversation with other people we become 
better at inner dialogue. 
(Turkle 2015, 10) 
Turkle then explains how "technology disrupts this virtuous cycle" (Turkle 
2015, 10). The prompts and affordances of PIT have a far-reaching impact 
on all three basic elements-solitude, friendship, and society-by disrupting 
the stillness and patience required for empathy: 
We are so accustomed to being always connected that being alone seems 
like a problem that technology should solve. And this is where the virtu­
ous cycle breaks down: Afraid of being alone, we struggle to pay atten­
tion to ourselves. And what suffers is our ability to pay attention to each 
other. If we can't find our own center, we lose confidence in what we 
have to offer others. 
(Turkle 2015, 10) Changes in Habits and Problematic Effects 
Turkle analyzes disruptions to conversation and empathy as a social scientist 
and therapist-documenting how changes in technological practice can alter 
both emotional and physical habits; these new habits are connected with 
increasingly problematic situations in psychological and social life. Impor­
tant changes in habits engendered recently by PIT include: (1) "hyper atten­
tion" (as opposed to "deep attention") where attention shifts constantly; 
(2) "multi-tasking" (as opposed to "uni-tasking"), the rapid switching between 
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actions; (3) "fear of  missing out," a constant anticipation of  updates, even 
emergencies; (4) avoidance of co-present interactions (by substituting PIT) 
because they pose what seems, now, as too great a risk of emotional intimacy; 
(5) "cognitive offloading," where device or online information resources are 
substituted for natural memory; and, (6) increased impatience with inter­
personal situations containing lulls and silences; such lulls increasingly seem 
like evils to escape rather than fallow moments generative of new discovery. 
These changes have generated, Turkle argues, significant psychological 
and social problems. Here are five of the more important ones. 
(1) Solitude and loneliness. Constant connection and hyper-attention 
increase impatience with silence, lulls; this impedes the ability to be 
alone, self-reflective, and exploratory of one's own feelings and imagi­
nation. For many, creative "solitude" has become "loneliness" or "bore­
dom." There is a feedback effect, as anxiety to escape loneliness increases 
the frequency and intensity of digital connections. As Turkle puts it: "In 
our new culture of connection, we are lonely but afraid of intimacy" 
(Turkle 2015, 357). 
(2) Alone-with-others. This impatience with silence/lulls also diminishes the 
ability to be alone with others; quiet moments of companionship with 
friends or children become increasingly intolerable. Again, the affor­
dance of external stimulation is invited to punctuate those spaces. One 
casualty of this change is eye contact, which we know is deeply impor­
tant to infant and childhood development (Turkle 2015, 28,  36). 
( 3) Conversational impoverishment. The anxieties mentioned earlier pro­
duce a profound effect upon conversational length and depth. Besides 
overt disruptions to conversation via divided attention (users multi­
tasking, interrupted by notifications, etc.), studies indicate that phones 
need merely to be present-even just face down-to impoverish conver­
sation (Turkle 2015, 21) .  Anticipating interruption, conversations are 
becoming shorter and less intellectually and emotionally adventurous; 
pale "connection" is replacing earnest "conversation" (Turkl-e 2015, 27, 
35). Having lowered expectations about what conversation can deliver, 
we also anticipate less earnestness or empathy from partners. Echoing 
some of Gergen's concerns, Turkle worries about the amplificatioµ of 
coarseness and emotional distance in the way we relate. 
(4) Existential displacement (absent presence). As with other theorists, 
Turkle pays considerable attention to absent presence. But she is 
more concerned than many about how this degrades being together, 
co-presence. The capacity and temptation to be "elsewhere" is -now 
embedded in how we inhabit place and time; moreover, powerful PIT 
techniques keep emerging to keep users online ("clickbait" ). "When we 
have our phones in our hands," Turkle writes, "we are invited to stay in 
the world of our phones" (Turkle 2015, 124 ). Such invitations to remain 
"elsewhere" change the nature of domestic, professional, religious, and 
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(5) 
public spaces; not only are we seduced away, but we now 
present a new 
public-facing mien: "do not disturb me."
8 Friction-free engagement. At least in developed countries, there is an 
increasing assumption that most tasks can be done eff
ortlessly, by 
remote control-as evinced by the expression, "There
's an app for 
that." PIT extends this assumption, Turkle notes, to po
litics (texting, 
donating, etc.), social intercourse (via texting, Faceboo
k), and family 
disagreements (over chat) .  In other words, the meta-messa
ge of PIT is 
that everything can be made convenient-including d
ifficult, messy, 
human interactions. Turkle's concern is that these pres
umptions will 
play 'into more frequent miscommunication, and even
 the fraying of 
social bonds.9 Extending Turkle's Concerns: PIT and Experience 
This review of Turkle is sufficient to show that fundamental changes are at 
work beyond the level of actions, practices, and norms. Changes are being 
effected at fundamental levels of both reflective and non-reflective experi­ence. I turn now to a brief review of the pragmatic notion of "experience," 
especially focusing on the account given by Dewey and James of experience 
in its basal form. "Experience" is a concept that, once understood, offers 
a handle that philosophers, theorists, and everyday users might use to 
appreciate the subtler ways new technologies affect us. In addition, prag­
matic experience links us to an alternative aesthetic vision regarding how 
new habits might be reconfigured in ways more meaningful than those 
foisted upon us, willy-nilly, by for-profit companies, futurists, and other 
techno-mandarins. Philosophers Dewey, James, and McDermott on Experience Escaping Epistemology: Experience vs. Knowledge 
How might Dewey diagnose problems arising in daily life under the impinge­
ments of information technology? First, one should recall that Dewey began 
by rejecting one of philosophy's earliest prejudices: that experience was infe­
rior to knowledge. While the history of "  experience" is long and complicated, 
Dewey (and other classical pragmatists) argued that the term's exoneration 
was crucial to shifting away from metaphysical and epistemological dual­
isms.10 In the new Darwinian Weltanschauung, change-not permanence­
was the ineliminable basis for stories about human beings and their natural 
environment. In a dynamic and changing arena, successful adaptive crea­
tures develop capacities and utilize resources necessary to survive and grow. 
While experience certainly includes sensory and emotional components (as 
the tradition insisted), pragmatists rejected reductive "input/output" sche­
mas that made sensation and emotion primordial suppliers of materiel for 
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intellectual work. Indeed, there were various ways, pragmatists said that 
s�nsation� (as received) were indebted to a range of prior influences (;ogni­
t�ve, physic�l, ;tc.); b� �raming sensat_
io_n as another activity, they empha­
sized sensat10n s select1v1ty. That select1v1ty was never reducible to reason in 
any p�re or isolated sense, but depended on a variety of factors, many not 
reflective. Moreover, "reflection" was also framed as something creatures 
constantly do; thus, the philosophical traditions' predilection to intellectu­
ally prescind "powers" of the mind (sensation, cognition, imagination, etc. ) 
and then nominalize them was rejected. In place, pragmatists argued for 
a m?�e dynamic view of human habits which admitted that many of the 
tradltlonal powers could commingle in complex ways-ways which were 
saturated, even guided, by emotions. 
�h_is potted history (about pragmatists' escape from epistemology) 
anticipates the rescue of "experience" from its lowly status. By rejecting 
th� dual�sm between "experience" and "knowledge," it was now possible 
to mvest1gate the many forms and functions experience could take-as con­sciousness, as attention, as inquiry, as judgment, as imagination, and so on. 
They could offer a reconstructed account of what it meant to know or do 
�omet?ing-an account not embroidered with a rigid and narrow temporal­
tty (stimulus-to-response, sensation-to-conception) .  One lesson of Dewey's 
famous 1896 "Reflex Arc" paper was that human responses should be seen 
as constituting cir�uits_ or s�tuations; such situations are, themselves, part of 
more comprehensive s1tuat10ns. The intended lesson, for epistemology, was 
that our m?re _comple� responses to the world-"knowledge," -emerged 
from expenential circmts; these experiences are "had" and become available 
fo� futur: uses. Tests of knowledge claims should be understood in light of 
this frammg-as experiments which take place in experience. 
�alient he�e is that James and Dewey were arguing for a conception of 
active expenence no longer awaiting validation by static, reflective knowl­
edge. _Rather, th: masterstroke was declaring experience 's autonomy; if the 
que�t10n -:vas raised whether a present experience was "right," the answer 
lay m the issuances of future experience. As John McDermott puts it: 
Rather than honoring a simple dualism between thought and action 
the American bent toward the practical should be viewed from a wide; 
perspective. Both the method of reflection and the method of action are 
to be seen as conjoined and rotating functionaries of an experimental 
approach. 
(McDermott 1976, 10) 
What this "rotating priority of thought and action" exemplifies McDermott 
adds, is that: 
' 
e_xperie?ce, as such, has informing, directive, and self-regulating quali­
ties which are ordered and managed as subject to intelligence and as 
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responsible to the burdens of the various contexts in w
hich inquiry 
finds itself. Experience, as such, is educational. 
(McDermott 1976, 10) The Continuum of Experience: From Had to Known 
Though Dewey rejected epistemologies' elevation of knowing over feel­
ing and acting, he nevertheless recognized there were genuine, functional 
distinctions indicated by those terms. In works such as Experience and Nature, Dewey delineated two basic kinds or levels of experience to help 
explain those distinctions. Most basic is what he sometimes calls "primary," 
"direct," or "had" experience. It is minimally reflected upon or regulated; 
it is felt, . qualitative. The other kind of experience he names "secondary," 
"mediated," or "reflective" experience. This form of engagement operates 
more abstractly, apart from the immediacy of feeling or the shock of events. 
Secondary experience takes an interest in arranging and rearranging sym­
bolic elements, sizing up relations and connections, in service of some fur­
ther purpose. 11  
The two kinds of experience may be seen on a continuum because both 
co-constitute the flow of our lives-ways of being, so to speak. (They can be 
categorized as "primary" or "secondary," as "feeling" or "cognition" insofar 
as there is a use for those labels-e.g., in psychological or philosophical inqui­
ries.) What is important, though, is that "primary" ("had") experience is fun­
damental, the qualitative how imbuing every situation. There is a how to the 
way one is feeling, acting, or even calculating; I awake perturbedly; I solve a 
crossword puzzle relaxedly; I suss out my flight's gate hurriedly, etc. Note that 
the "had" aspect of these experiences is not reflective. A reflective experience 
is always had in some way, but a had experience is not always reflective. (This 
explains why reflective experience is designated as secondary by Dewey.) Aspects of Primary Experience Relevant to Technology 
The foregoing effectively conveys how what James called "radical empiri­
cism" was integral to classical pragmatism. To get at what was practically 
at stake in our meanings and actions-the commonly understood purpose 
of "pragmatism"-one needed to not only debunk bad dualisms, but also 
take a more earnest approach to what was being experienced. To try to take 
experience as it is had, to observe and describe without the heavy-handed 
intrusion of theoretical preconceptions-that was the insight. 12 
The relevance of radical empiricistic pragmatism for our purposes, then, 
is to utilize it to reconceptualize and reexamine anew the effects of the 
technologies under scrutiny here. Doing this requires some familiarity with 
pragmatism's close analyses of experience at the "had" or "primary" level. 
Here, in brief, are several aspects of primary experience useful for a fulsome 
critique of contemporary technological experience. 
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In wor�s like The Princ�ples of Psychology, James called out philosophers 
for placmg undue attent10� upon t�ings rather than relations. Famously, he 
urged
_ new respect for relauons, notmg that without relations, things become 
meanmgl_
ess. As �cDermott points out, for James, "Meaning is located in 
�he ongomg fabnc ?f relations, by which we mean it is found neither in an 
ISolated self n�r an isolated thing but, rather, in the environment constituted 
by s�ared part1cip�tion" (McDermott 2007, 358). Dewey richly details how 
relational_ transact10ns between organism and environment cross various 
culturnl fields (e_
ducati?n, politics, aesthetics, and more). 
Besides weamng thmk:rs from a disproportionate attention to things, 
Ja�e� and Dewey used this new emphasis upon relations to downgrade the 
pnonty placed upon concepts. Concepts, too often, provide pat formulas 
that ar� ta�en as permanent realities. Such "vicious abstractionism" (James) 
was a . philosophic f�llacy" (Dewey) that induces formulaic thinking and 
d
_
esens1�1zes our attent10n from the moving, emotional, and qualitative expe­
riences imbued the flow of events. Fringe vs. Focus-Experience as Pervasively Qualitative 
The sh_ift t_oward rel�ti�ns an� away from things and concepts can be under-
stood m light of a s1blmg adJustment involving "focus" and "f · " H "  
· 1 1  h"l 
rmge. 1s-
ton�a Y, P i osop�y's development has centered upon the intellectual quest 
clarity and d:fimti�n. _Pragmatists drew back from their discipline's myopic 
feal1?' to clanty, pomt1�g out that conscious foci are possible only because 
of frmge elements not m focus As James puts i't "Our f1"eld f 
h 
. . · , s o experience 
�ve no more defmite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are 
fringed forever by a MORE that continuously develops, and that continu­
ou�ly sup�r�:des the�_as _
life proceeds." (James 1978, 1 58) James' "more" 
�efies defmm?n �et 1S,,
md1spensable for meaningful experience. "The expe­
nencmg of this frmge, �cDermott writes, "yields awareness while defying 
�ny con�eptu�l formulation. For James, the crucial area of human activity 
1s found precisely where the conceptual order breaks down " {McDermott 
2007, 353) 
In "Qualitative Thought
_,
" �ewey tak�s up James's point. However, Dewey 
refuses to call such qu�htat1ve expenence a "fringe" because that term 
und�rstates the way a umty of pervasive and underlying qualities "regulates 
fert_
mence_ or . relevancy and force of every distinction and relation" and 
gmd�� selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit 
terms. The presence of such a quality, Dewey continues: 
enables us to keep thinking about one problem without our having con­
�tantly to stop to ask ourselves what it is after all that we are think­
mg about. We are aware of it not by itself but as the background, the 
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thread, and the directive clue in what we do expressly think of. For the 
latter things are its distinctions and relations. 
(Dewey LW5, 247-48 13 
How are these ideas ("fringe" or "pervasive quality") relevant to technol­
ogy? For one thing, we can better see how PIT 's new rhythms intervene in 
our typical fringe/background experience. They tend to reinforce prejudice against the ambient fringes and toward the overt and bright. "Modern man 
is . . .  a victim of clarity. Much of our difficulty proceeds from the demand 
for certitude and an inability to recognize and live with the irreducibility of 
shadows" (McDermott 2007, 350) .  We should be aware that PIT desensi­
tizes us to fringe experience; we become less able to acknowledge experience 
outside of conscious focus, and less inclined to remember it as necessary to 
meaning.14 The Connotative: Experience as Learning-_Capable 
In addition to the ontological points James and Dewey made (about rela­
tions and transactions) and those regarding the phenomenology of expe­
rience (fringe, focus, pervasive quality), they also highlighted experience's 
epistemological capacities-the ways in which experience generates knowl­
edge. Primary experience is "connotative"-not specious, but thick. It is a 
fabric of relations, of "perchings and flights," in James' phrase. Experience, 
ongoing, draws upon itself and projects anticipated futures. "Dewey accepts 
the claim of James that experiences are indeed cognitive of one another, so 
that the transaction is not without a guide, a source, leaning, a hint, a hunch" 
(McDermott 2007, 415). Thus, experience is not a Humean moment-after­
moment affair, but one capable of continuity. 
To learn from experience is to make a backward and forward connec­
tion between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from 
things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying, 
an experiment with the world to find out what it is like, the undergoing 
becomes instruction-discovery of the connection of things. 
(Dewey LWll ,  2 15) 
Again, this relates directly to technological life, raising the question: "is 
the primary experience on devices capable of subtle connotation, or is it 
dominated by intense titillation? "  Temporal Experience-Urban Time vs. Nature Time 
The last dimension of primary experience to discuss is temporality-how 
time feels. In Principles, James argues that time is experienced not as clo�k Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Experience of Technology 127 time-a specious, knife-edge present-but rather as durations of varying thicknesses and feels. He describes the cognized present as: a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of compo­sition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were-a rearward- and a forward-looking end. (James 1 983, 609) McDermott builds upon James, and considering the technology of the 1970s, distinguishes "urban time" and "nature time." Urban time tends to be faster, thin, tense, jagged, and aligned with machines; nature time con­nects, more variously, to natural events; it tends to be thick, liberating, and continuous (McDermott 2007, 200-201) The difference between these kinds of time becomes a useful critical tool for understanding contemporary technology. T he network of communication media . . .  constantly tunes us in to sen­sorially multiple experiences . . . .  Our imagination, and fed at all times by the messaging of electronic intrusions, races far ahead of our body which we often claim to drag around. (McDermott 2007, 201, 202) Technology problematizes life, in part, because while "the speed of urban time revs up our capacity for multiple experiences," it is also "intensifying the need for inner personal space to play out the experiences subsequently in our own 'good' time" (McDermott 2007, 202). The challenge we face, to a greater degree than did McDermott in 1974, is the never-ceasing "urban time" of devices. In the 21st century, information flow is relentless; there is never "enough time" to unfold, unravel, or unpack what is foisted upon us by "urban time." Between the portability of PIT and the near-omnipresence (via satellite) of connectivity, all spaces can become urban spaces, experien­tially. What theorist Richard Ling celebrates as the opportunity of "micro­coordination" would be seen, from McDermott's perspective, as the fulfillment of urban time's hegemony over primary experience. "We isolate here the dilu­tion of embodiment and the worship of speed" (McDermott 2007, 453). Technology, Experience, and Pragmatist Aesthetics Technology, at the end of the day, expresses how human beings suppose they want to live; whether we are talking about affordances such as "video on­demand," "constant availability," "micro-coordination," or "online dating," they are all arranged by us (engineers, managers, marketers, and consumers). What philosophers (and philosophical theorists such as Turkle) can do is back 
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up and raise the normative question: "are these choices producing the kinds 
of lives we ideally want to live?"  This ethical question is also an aesthetic one 
about what is ideal; pragmatist aesthetics may have some suggestions. 
As we have seen, descriptions of experience with technology can be more 
or less explicitly normative. In this piece, Gergen, Turkle, and McDermott 
raised profound normative questions about the patterns of experience PIT 
can create. What grounds the normativity of such judgments? As a psy­chologist, Turkle is concerned about the constituents of psychological well­
being: sympathy, empathy, and authentic communication; she warns against 
isolation, loneliness, disconnection, and alienation. The philosophical case 
can reach toward further grounds about the nature of experience. Here, 
pragmatist aesthetics (utilizing the criteria of experience offered earlier) can 
provide standards with which to judge the upshot a way of life shot through 
with PIT experiences. Here, I select Dewey's aesthetics as my model. An (Consummatory) Experience in Dewey 
At the heart of Dewey's aesthetics was his notion of experience at its best: 
"an experience" or " consurnmatory experience." The opposite he termed the 
"anesthetic." Understanding this spectrum can provide metrics with which 
to judge technological experience. Dewey introduces "an experience" (his 
emphasis) by contrasting it with ordinary experience-the humdrum, dis­
persed, and inchoate character which is part of everyday life. 
Oftentimes . . .  the experience had is inchoate. Things are experienced 
but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience. There 
is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and what we think, what 
we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other . . .  because of 
extraneous interruptions or of inner lethargy. 
In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when the 
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment . Then and then only 
is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experi­
ence from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is 
satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a 
situation . . .  is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not 
a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own 
individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience . . .  [and 
in it] . . .  every successive part flows freely, without seam and without 
unfilled blanks, into what ensues. 
(LWl0:42) 
This extended passage may reveal why critics often found it hard to connect 
the term "aesthetics" with Dewey. Dewey's general project is wider than 
art criticism; rather, he sees art as a form of human expression capable of 
illuminating ways that experience, more generally, can manifest as whole, 
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harmonious, and exemplary in meaning. Understanding art as experienc­
ing provides an object lesson as to how daily life experience could be more 
meaningful, even beautiful. And understanding what can go wrong in art 
helps reveal the "anesthetic," features which are present all too often in daily 
life. Here, again, such analyses of experience can help highlight which of our 
habits are anesthetic habits-both the older or newer ones (especially those 
imported through new technologies). Having discussed consummatory, let 
us briefly consider the .anesthetic. Anesthetic Experience 
Opposed to an experience is the anesthetic. The anesthetic is actually a lethal 
cocktail, comprised of two different poisons-one is slackness, dissolution, 
while the other constriction, coercion. As Dewey puts it: 
The enemies of the esthetic are neither the practical nor the intellectual. 
They are the humdrum; slackness of loose ends; submission to conven­
tion in practice and intellectual procedure. Rigid abstinence, coerced 
submission, tightness on one side and dissipation, incoherence and aim­
less indulgence on the other, are deviations in opposite directions from 
the unity of an experience. 
(Dewey LW10, 47) 
Again, the anesthetic pertains both to the experiences of art and daily life. 
Much in contemporary life, Dewey argues, prevents it from being fulfilling. 
He notices, as does McDermott, the "urban time" phenomenon which pre­
vents ordinary experience from being more fulfilling. We suffer from what 
he calls an " excess of receptivity"-what we might call "information over­
load." In our lives, Dewey writes, 
Zeal for doing, lust for action, leaves many a person, especially in this 
hurried and impatient human environment in which we live, with expe­
rience of an almost incredible paucity, all on the surface. No one experi­
ence has a chance to complete itself because something else is entered 
upon so speedily. 
(Dewey LWlO, 51)  
Dewey noticed that the increased pace of life, the adoptions of  various 
forms of technology (not limited to information technology) had changed 
the habits and expectations people held for themselves-and others. What 
happens, in such cases, is the impoverishment of experience over the long 
term. He writes: 
What is prized is then the mere undergoing of this and that, irrespec­
tive of perception of any meaning. The crowding together of as many 
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impressions as possible is thought to be "life," eve� though no one of 
them is more than a flitting and a sipping. What 1s called experience 
becomes so dispersed and miscellaneous as hardly to deserve the name. 
Resistance is treated as an obstruction to be beaten down,
_ 
not as an 
invitation to reflection. An individual comes to seek, unconsc10usly even 
more than by deliberate choice, situations in which he can do the most 
things in the shortest time. 
(Dewey LWlO, 51)  Technology and Pragmatist Aesthetic Ideals 
Pragmatist aesthetics offers more than just criticisms, though; it
_ 
offers an 
ideal to assess how technology can lead us away from expenences w_e 
acknowledge are better, more enduring, more meaningful. �ot all expen­
ence is the same; experiences which have reached a zemth of c�mple,� tion and wholeness yield what Dewey called "consum�a_tory expenence, 
whereas other experiences can fall short in various spec1f1C ways. 
_
Prag1!1a­
tist aesthetics such as Dewey's are informed by our nature 
_
as b1olog!cal 
beings, and remain open to scientific findin_gs about �ttent1on, �mot10n, 
neural activity, and so forth; still, pragmatist aesthetics r�cogmzes that 
aesthetics should be meliorative-a way to improve expenence through­
out our lives. 
Much of what I have laid out is, admittedly, cursory. But what seems 
clear is that problems illustrated by Turkle and othe_rs-interr�pted c_on­
versations, disrupted public spaces, fragmented attent10n, overst1mulat1on, 
ennui, etc.-call out not only for new rules of etiquette but deeper no_rma­
tive assessments, particularly the ways in which deeper levels of expene�c_e 
are affected. My sketch of Dewey's pragmatist aesthetics means to exh1b1t 
the viability of applying pragmatist aesthetic criter
_
ia to PIT and other tec�­
nologies; regarding details, it must remain a pro��ssory note. �ventuall!, it 
demands a point-by-point mapping between spec1f1c technological practices 
and their aesthetic attributes.15  
. . 
My brief need not be taken as neither pessimism nor dete�mm1sm abo�t 
technology. PIT can and does produce consummatory expenentes; there 1s 
no reason it cannot be designed to produce more-and/or reduce the ways 
it contributes to the various forms of anesthesia around us. It c�n becorr_ie 
a more "appropriate technology," as Alan Drengson ( 1982) 
_
m1gh� put 1t, 
affording space to the viewer-experiencer rather t�a� suffocatmg with con­
stant prompts. An appropriate technology can mv1te gently, 
_so that one 
becomes freely absorbed in a new experience. But let us be realists, too. Let 
us not suppose we are there-or heading there, yet. 16 While tools can be 
shelved or redesigned to seek better ends, I am reluctant to_ thi�k the� will 
be without criticism. Pragmatist aesthetics offers an expenential basis for 
such criticism. 
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To briefly summarize my argument, this inquiry began with a feeling that 
something is amiss about the ways PIT affects individual and social life; 
the inquiry moved next to an initial characterization of the problem. Then 
the problem was described in richer empirical detail, asking: what kinds of 
technology? How are they colonizing attention? With what initial conse­
quences ?  The work of communication theorists and especially Turkle helped 
lay out these aspects, arid Turkle's foci on conversation and empathy were 
especially helpful in displaying the complex psychological and social stakes. 
These initial phases showed that there was a further philosophical dimen­
sion worth exploring; I suggested that technology impinges upon something 
even more fundamental that the conduct singled out by Turkle et al. This 
fundamental thing is experience. 
To explore technology's implications for experience, we looked at Dewey, 
James, and McDermott. After reviewing pragmatism's critical reconstruc­
tion of the term, we saw that Dewey (and James) developed a distinc­
tion between had/primary experience and known/secondary experience. 
The had-primary/known-secondary distinction legitimates their detailed 
work on the phenomenology of had-primary experience (e.g., relations, 
qualities, fringe, focus, connotativeness, temporality) which, I argue, can 
now help frame and make sense of the welter of changes introduced by 
new PIT. 
Finally, I argued that these philosophical instruments-analyses of 
experience-lead toward a constructive last stage: the application of a pragma­
tist aesthetics (constituted by experiential analyses) to the phenomena of PIT. 
In the end, technology really doesn't matter. What matters are empathy, 
care, justice, and consummatory experience. The reason to care about prag­
matism, as a conceptual tool for the analysis of practices, is its commitment as a theory to meliorism-to remaining in honest touch with practical life to 
make it better. Because pragmatism is equipped to understand the habits of 
both organisms and their cultural environments, it can evaluate the variety 
of experiences which emerge. Such evaluations are, themselves, tools for the 
direction of better, future experience. Because technology is so pervasively 
informing our habits, it is now falling under pragmatism's critical purview. 
This paper has provided one critical approach. 
The inspiration for doing this work now is prompted by watching my 
students and my own children. Forces beyond my control are driving dis­
traction, ennui, and perhaps depression. What is technology's role in this? I 
need to find out. Like Dewey, I am ethically staked in promoting growth. As 
McDermott points out: 
Growth is not a casual word for Dewey, for its absence denotes dying, 
as when children, by virtue of the pedagogical ennui which so often 
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envelops them, become dead unto themselves. In our time they esc
ape 
into varieties of electronic media. 
(McDermott 2007, 423) 
Dewey worried that the schools of his day were trading away the 
r�c�mess 
of the present for some supposedly more important futu�e. They demg
rated 
the potentialities and direct enjoyments of present �x�en�nce and fo
mented 
on children the anesthetic poisons of slackness, d1ss1panon. Many 
schoo�s 
and workplaces today are still doing this. Too often, attempts to c
ure th�s 
are proposed by new technologi:s; yet they may present the other a�esthetic 
poison of overstimulation. Curmg boredom with the ever-app�alm
g new 
seems like progress; but understood through the lens _of
 pr�g1?1at1st aest�et­
ics we see how it can lack fullness. The technological fix 1s our version 
of 'rhe specious present James warned about, the isolated moments w
hich 
entertain but don't teach, connect but do not pause for regenerative so
litude 
or genuine conversation. We are taking big gambles; we should take a 
closer 
look. Notes 1. This is a traditional ambition of classical pragmatists such as John De1weyd, Whi�­liam James, G.H. Mead, Jane Addams, and others. Dewey encap�u. ate t 1s vision by calling philosophers "liaison officers": "philosoph_y as a cn�1cal <?r?an becomes in effect a messenger, a liaison officer, makmg reciprocally mtell�g1ble voices speaking provincial tongues, and thereby enlarging as well as rectifymg the meaning with which they ace charged." (De�ey LWl,  306_) . _ " 2. Ling's industry association is with Telenoi:-, a firm t�at descnbes itself as one of the world's major mobile operators" with 176 m1lhon customers c�mnected in 12 markets across Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. [URL: www.telenor.com Accessed 14 January 2018]. . 3. Consider the ritual of a birthday party. PIT can extend such co-present mter�c­tions to later online periods (e.g., by sharing photos via the web).  P�oto-�harmg may itself become part of the ritual. In this way, the co-present relat1onsh1ps may be strengthened via new rituals. _ _ , 4. As it is alleged Microsoft did in cooperation "".ith the N:uo_nal Security Agency s Prism program. As The Guardian reported m 2013, Microsoft_ has collabo­rated closely with US intelligence services to allow users' commu1:1canons to be intercepted, including helping the National Security Agency to c1rc1;1mvent the company's own encryption, according to top-secret documents obtamed by the Guardian" (Greenwald et al. 201 3). 5. Sherry Turkle, MIT website; www.mit.edu/-stur�l_e/ Accessed 20 August 2017. 6 .  URL: www.amazon.com/Fisher-Price-Ipad-Appt1v1ty-Seat-Newborn-to-Toddler/ dp/B00EL4N15U Accessed 16  January 201_8. . . _ _ _ 7. As Baym cautions, "we need to stop talkmg ab?ut me�a m overly s1mphst1c terms" and seek out "concepts to help us recognize the d1vers1ty amongst what may seem to be just one technology" (Bay_m �01,? , 6-7_) . . 8. As Baym points out, PIT often "doubly pnvatize _pubhc spaces-:-first, �ser� opt out of public space availability, and second, they fill that space with their pnvate matters (Baym 2015, 5 ) .  ,. Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Experience of Technology 133 9. See e.g., Turkle (201 5, 52-53). Thus, one might say, PIT takes the concept of a "device" to the next level. Over 30 years ago, philosopher Albert Borgmann (1984) described the evolution of a "device paradigm" disconnecting people from the sources of their heat, food, and consumer goods. Such " disburden­ments," Borgmann pointed out, hide the natural and social connections implicit in our practices. Though such changes increase conveniences, there is also an increase in fragility, as we become less informed and less self-reliant. 10. On the history of "experience" see Jay (2005). 1 1 .  See The Quest for Cer_fqinty. There, Dewey writes, Experienced situations come about in two ways and are of two distinct types. Some take place with only a minimum of regulation, with little fore­sight, preparation, and intent. Others occur because, in part, of the prior occurrence of intelligent action. Both kinds are had; they are undergone, enjoyed or suffered. The first are not known; they are not understood; they are dispensations of fortune or providence. T he second have, as they are experienced, meanings that present the funded outcome of operations that substitute definite continuity for experienced discontinuity and for the frag­mentary quality due to isolation. (Dewey LW4, 194) 12. This is not phenomenological bracketing a la Husserl; pragmatists did not advo­cate that a neutral (free of all cultural, historical, and personal valences) account of experience could or should be strived for. But they recognized that theoretical preconceptions can pervert genuine openness to experience; some amount of "intellectual disrobing" (as Dewey put it) was possible and worth attempting. See Dewey LWl,  40. 13. Richard Shusterman traces this movement from James' Principles to Dewey's Art as Experience. In Principles, James writes that "Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it . . . .  The signifi­cance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it." (James 1983, 246) As Shusterman points out, "This 'halo of felt rela­tions,' James continues, forms a 'psychic overtone' or 'fringe' whose felt quality essentially guides our consciousness, selecting and organizing the elements and focus of our thought so as to render them coherently unified in terms of their felt 'sense of affinity' to that quality. 'Any thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves "all right" [may be considered] . . .  a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.' (James 1983, 247, 249, 250)" (Shusterman 201 1 ,  359). 14. We need to accept that "ambiguity bathes our experience" and that this means " the one-to-one correspondence between the perceptual act and the objective order is challenged" (McDermott 2007, 354). 15. I don't, however, think this would be very hard to fulfill. Even Dewey's simple comparison between our pace of life and the obstacle it creates for engaging in art or conversation makes that plain-Turkle would happily concur. In modern life, Dewey writes: Continued acceleration is breathless and prevents parts from gaining dis­tinction. In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so-just as in a genial conversation there is a continuous interchange and blending, and yet each speaker not only retains his own character but manifests it more clearly than is his wont. (Dewey LWl0, 43-44) 
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